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Introduction
In their widely-read paper on economic growth and the environment, Grossman and Krueger (1995)
wrote “a limitation of the reduced-from approach...is that it is unclear why the estimated relationship
between pollution and income exists.” They referred to their work as “an important first step,”
effectively putting forward a challenge to develop microeconomic foundations for “environmental
Kuznets’ curves” and launching a large literature. While much of this literature further explores the
reduced-form relationship between per capita income and different dimensions of environmental
quality, several authors have focused on tracing the ultimate theoretical sources of observed income
paths [see for example Lopez and Mitra (2000), Andreoni and Levison (2001)], and on “factoring”
environmental income effects into meaningful components [see Hilton and Levinson (1998)]. In the
current vernacular, the “scale effect” on environment results from an economy’s increased capacity to
generate pollution as it grows, but a “technique effect” mitigates this as higher incomes result in greater
demand for environmental quality [see Antweiler, et al (2001)]. The early literature was motivated by
concern over the likely environmental impacts of a NAFTA still under negotiation [Grossman and
Krueger (1995), Shafik and Bandyopadyay (1992), World Bank (1992)], and substantial theoretical
insight (including the above terminology) has come from work on trade and environment.
The importing of dirty goods, and the effects of trade liberalization on the environment in general,
have understandably received a great deal of attention. However, some of the most pressing
environmental problems have notably little to do with international trade. The primary sources of air
pollution, particulate matter and sulfur dioxide for example, are electic power generation and
automobile exhaust. By focusing on non-traded sources of pollution, this paper provides a complement
to the trade and literature in the effort to develop microeconomic foundations for environment –
development relationships in two ways. First, a demand-side model traces the environmental impacts of
changes in the income distribution to the household level. This aggregation exercise highlights the
obvious fact that pollution is not really a function of per capita income, but of demand for both private
and public goods by millions of households whose incomes are characterized by a whole distribution.
The relationship of income inequality as well as mean income to pollution levels is explored formally
and estimated empirically for several air pollution measures.
Second, a simple model of the political-economy process by which the public good of
environmental protection is provided by government in response to demand for abatement generates a
valuable insight: “abatement” (technique) effects are fundamentally interacted with government in a
way that “gross emissions” (or scale) effects are not, leading to a econometric specification capable of
identifying them separately. The structural specification is to my knowledge new to the literature, as are
the resulting estimates of income elasticities of demand for pollution abatement. These estimated
elasticities are found to be large, lending support to the notion that environmental quality is a luxury
good. Estimated “scale” elasticities are smaller, giving rise to the likelihood that an inverted-U
relationship exists for some pollutants. The now-traditional calculation of a “turning point” level of per
capita income is provided for each pollutant under different conditions. The results suggest a central
role for government responsiveness in the income paths of environmental variables: unmet demand for
public goods yields no technique effect, so weaker government pushes the turning point outward at
least, and increases the likelihood that one doesn’t exist.
A model of demand for pollution and abatement
There are two key income effects at the household level with respect to the environment. The first isincreasing demand for (normal) goods, some of which generate pollution at the stage of production (eg.
electric power) or consumption (e.g. gasoline). As consumption of these “dirty goods” expands, the
economy-wide capacity to generate pollution increases. The second effect derives from the fact that the
environment itself is a normal good, so higher income leads also to increasing demand for pollution
control. The net result of these two effects on the environment is not immediately clear, but the notion
that the first dominates at lower levels of income and the second at higher levels is a modern folk
theorem for inverted-U shaped environment – development relationships. This explanation is
incomplete
Utility maximizing households demand a vector of goods, x, potentially representing both private
goods consumption and household production activities. The vector of (uncompensated) demands by
household i is written as a deterministic function of income, yi, and a vector of prices, h,p l u saz e r o
mean, idiosyncratic component, i:
1 xi  xyi,h  i.
In this framework h summarizes all supply side effects, the discussion of which is largely suppressed
here.The function x captures any systematic relationship between demand and income, leaving the
idiosyncratic component  uncorrelated with y. If utility depends separably on a set of public goods and
bads, P, indirect utility for a household can be written:
2 Vy,h;P .
GDP is distributed such that incomes of N individuals are drawn from a p.d.f. fy;,  0,
with parameters  and , representing the mean and dispersion of household income in the population.1
Aggregate emissions are then decomposed as follows: xj is an element of x for which production or
consumption is associated with a pollution externality. Uncontrolled or gross emissions associated with
xj, Ej













0 is emissions intensity and h
0 is the price vector in the absence of regulation. The superscripts
on  and h are necessary because government regulation aimed at emissions abatement is likely to
operate through these parameters, a subject taken up shortly. Crucially, 3 holds only when Xj
(quantity demanded) equals domestic production, or for “consumption externalities” where the
environmental impact is at the point of consumption regardless of where the good was produced. This
framework is therefore explicitly not about trade. As we will see,
Ej
0 is not the observed emissions level however if effective abatement policy is implemented by
government. Let Aj represent abatement of j emissions, and aj 
Aj
Ej
0 represent the fraction of gross
emissions abated. Net emissions and the concentration of pollutant j, respectively, can then be written:
4aE j  Ej
0  Aj  Ej
01  aj
4bP js  Ej
0  Aj Ej
01  aj ,
where  is a transfer function relating j emissions to concentrations at site s. This transfer function is
assumed to be linear.2
Optimal and actual abatement
How much abatement is undertaken depends on abatement costs, willingness-to-pay for abatement,
and the efficiency of public good provision by government. For the remainder of this section, the jsubscripts will be suppressed, though the focus remains on an individual pollutant. Assume abatement
costs are a general function of abatement and gross emissions:
5 CA,E0
In 5 costs are increasing in abatement, but decreasing in gross emissions (holding abatement
constant). Efficient pollution control policy equates the marginal cost of abatement to the aggregate
marginal willingness-to-pay for abatement. Marginal willingness-to-pay for an individual is derived






Imposing constant marginal damages for simplicity, willingness-to-pay for abatement at the aggregate
level is:




Using equations 5 and 7, the operative Samuelson condition is:
8 CAA,E0  W.
Inverting 8 yields optimal abatement as a function of both gross emissions and marginal
willingness-to-pay, and ultimately their component elements:
9 AW,E0  A,j
0N,,,h
0
Finally, for a host of reasons government do not have the capacity or inclination to implement
optimal regulation. This interaction with political economy affects abatement, but not gross emissions.
We model this interaction using a policy efficiency parameter, , as follows:
10a E  E01  a  E01  a,
where a  A
E0 . In this specification   1 implies efficient regulation, where the full amount of
optimal abatement is undertaken;   0 implies no regulation, where net emissions are equal to gross
emissions. For values of  in an intermediate range, net emissions are between optimal and gross
emissions. (The possibility that   1, reflecting over-zealous regulation, is not ruled out). More on the
nature of  follows in a discussion of its measurement in the empirical section. From 4b, the observed
concentration of the pollutant at site s is:
10b Ps  E01  a .
Income effects on net emissions
From the above we can decompose pollution changes resulting from a change in the income
distribution into elasticities of demand for both private x and public a goods. Furthermore, this
macro-level decomposition derives from individual-level demands, and income effects on demand at
that level provide predictions about the corresponding aggregate elasticities. These predictions are
summarized in Table 1, with formal proofs provided in the Appendix. The decomposition yields:11a P  E0   a
1a a
11b P  E0   a
1a a.
Equation 11a captures the change in pollution along the typical environmental Kuznets curve:
pollution concentration can rise or fall with a change in per capita income, the outcome determined by
the relative magnitude of relevant elasticities. From 3, E0  xy: the elasticity of emissions with
respect to mean income is simply the elasticity of mean consumption of xj with respect to household
income (proof in Appendix). This increase in mean income holding the dispersion of income constant
amounts to a rightward shift in the income p.d.f.: a marginal increase in income “across the board”,
which corresponds to increases in consumption if xj is a normal good. The elasticity of a with respect
to mean income has two components: a  aW  W  aE0  E0. The first term derives from
demand for pollution control, and is positive as long as this too is a normal good (by similar reasoning
to that for x, see Appendix). Under a rather strong restriction on the abatement cost function, C,
aE0  0a n da reduces to aW  W. 3 In such a case this elasticity can be interpreted as a pure
abatement demand effect; otherwise it is combined with a gross emissions interaction effect. As with
total demand for x, the response of total willingness-to-pay for abatement to an income shift can be
reduced to an average household-level response: W  wy (see Appendix).Crucially, the effects of a
is interacted in 11a with the political parameter, . It is insufficient that abatement simply be optimal;
in order for this effect to be observed it must be “provided” by a political process in a way that the gross
emissions effect does not. At the same time, political efficiency and capacity are surely correlated with
per capita income, highlighting the need to carefully control for political “regimes” in empirical work if
one is to identify the first two effects.
Equation 11b similarly details how a change in the distribution of income, holding mean income
constant, affects pollution levels. First, since E0  X0, gross emissions change as marginal income is
redistributed among individuals. The fraction of a marginal dollar spent on “dirty goods” will not in
general be equal for individuals in different parts of the income distribution, leading to a net change in
X. Specifically, if demand for x is concave in income, greater inequality will reduce X0 (and therefore
E0), as income is redistributed toward individuals who will spend a smaller fraction of a marginal dollar
on the good. By symmetry, where demand is convex in income (greater proportions of marginal income
are spent on the good as income rises) greater inequality will increase X0. 4 (See Appendix for proof).
The elasticity of a with respect to mean income 11b also has two components:
a  aW  W  aE0  E0. Aggregate marginal willingness-to-pay for pollution control is also
affected by an income redistribution as long as demand for this good is non-linear in income at the
household level (see Appendix). It is an empirical question whether individuals are willing to pay
greater proportions of marginal income for pollution control, but there is certainly common belief that
the environment is a luxury good. If so, greater inequality would actually increase W all else constant, a
somewhat counterintuitive result. Finally, 11b suggests a third source of an empirical relationship
between income inequality and the environment. It is extremely likely that inequality, measured by ,i s
(negatively) correlated with , measuring political responsiveness, capacity, and representation. It is this
last subject on which Torras and Boyce [14] focused. They point out that income inequality and
political power are closely related, and that therefore demand for abatement among the poor is ignored
in many societies.
Empirical specification and identification
Specify the following functional forms for E0 and a:E0  e012 a  e345
1  e345 .
Gross emissions are here a log-linear function of the parameters, implying that E0  1,a n d
E0  2. The logistic functional form for a is chosen to constrain predicted values of a to the unit
interval. This function implies a  41  a and a  51  a. Substituting the above
functions into 10 yields the structural environmental Kuznets equation
12 lnPjst  0  1lnst  2lnst  stln1  exp3  4ln  5ln  6N    vs  ust
where vs is the time-invariant fixed effect at the observational level of the dependent variable (either
city or country), and N   will be proxied for with population density (see data section below). Other
unobserved geographic or economic factors, including h
0, are assumed to be time-invariant and
therefore absorbed by vs. Remaining unobserved factors are represented in ust,where
Euit2  u
2 Euitujs  0 i  j,t  s.
The parameters in 12 can be estimated using non-linear least squares, with the vs estimated by
fixed effects dummy variables.5 A log-linear form for a yields a version of 12 that could be
estimated with standard panel data methods, but such a function would not constrain the implied value
of a to be positive. Results from a log-linear specification of a indicate this is a substantial
misspecification. Equation 12 is employed in the next section essentially unchanged for CO2,w h i c hi s
measured in tons of emissions rather than as a pollution concentration. The site-specific effects on
pollution concentrations include “assimilative capacity” and other geographic characteristics, but for
CO2 emissions they should be regarded as controlling only for economic characteristics.
From 12, the elasticity of net pollution is p  1  4a. The non-linearity introduced by the
logistic form of a makes this elasticity a decreasing function of  when 4  0. The “turning point”, or
maximum pollution income level, that has received so much attention in this literature is possible but
not imposed by this specification. A turning point, , occurs where the elasticity above is zero, i.e.
where a 
1
4 . 6 This condition reveals several key features about the parameters in the model and
their relationship to the “Kuznets curve”. Theory predicts only that 1 and 4 are positive. Their
relative magnitudes along with the variables  and  determine the shape of the per capita income –
environment relationship. As a can only asymptotically approach 1 as  increases, if
1
4  1t h e r ei s
no turning point. This has two clear implications, both of which are highly intuitive: (1) if 1  4 there
is no turning point; and (2) a decrease in  increases , and ultimately leads to no turning point. The
first says that if demand for polluting goods grows faster than demand for abatement, pollution will not
improve even if the provision of the public provision of pollution control is efficient   1.T h e
second is more central to the current analysis. The expression of demand for abatement is reduced when
 decreases, so pollution increases at all levels of income and the likelihood that no turning point exists
increases. Estimated  are reported in the results section for   1,  .75,  .5, and .25.
(Notice that where   0a n d1  0 there is no turning point). The centrality of public goods provision
to the “inverted-U” Kuznets curve shape in this model is opposite the mechanism presented by
Andreoni and Levinson (2001), who argue that the shape may arise from factors independent of
political economy.
The fact that E0 and a are functions of the same variables raises an identification question. This is
the econometric manefestation of the central issue: how to separate the gross emissions (scale) and
abatement (technique) effects of income on pollution. Identification is provided by the fact that demand
for abatement is fundamentally interacted with political effectiveness.7 The expression of a gross
emissions effect from higher incomes does not rely on political provision, but the expression of anabatement effect does. Pollution observed in countries with effective political institutions is therefore
net of abatement, while income effects on pollution in countries without effective institutions are purely
from gross emissions. Therefore with a measure of political effectiveness these two effects can be
separated.
Data
Dependent variables and demand-side sources
A. SO2,C O 2, and suspended particulates: heavy and “smoke”
Burning fossil fuels to generate electricity is a primary source of several pollutants, among them
CO2, SO2, and suspended particulates. Since electric power is rarely traded across countries, it is
accurate to describe the quantity of electricity generated with equation 3. Suppose xA1y is electricity
demand for a household with income y. Electricity consumption is a normal good, but is the income
elasticity greater or less than (or equal to) 1? The empirical literature shows short-run elasticities are
positive and generally less than one [see Branch (1993), Dahl (1992)]. This matches intuition:
households spend more on electricity as they become wealthier, but the marginal contribution of
additional income to electricity demand declines.
Automobile exhaust is in many cities the primary source of urban air pollution. Urban ozone,
particulates, and lead are among the pollutants associated with driving that cause concern for the
respiratory health of urban dwellers and urban aesthetics. Automobile emissions are a consumption
externality, meaning even though the ultimate source of pollution–fossil fuels–may be imported, the
environmental impact can be broken down by consumer demand for vehicle miles. Let xA2y be gross
demand for driving miles. Estimated income elasticities also indicate that driving miles increase with
income, but at a decreasing rate [see Yu (1990)]. Define the function exA2 as emissions of CO2, SO2,
and particulates generated from the activity of driving. Linearity assumes driving 10 miles generates
twice the pollution of 5 miles. This may not be the case if engines burn cleaner when they are warm,
etc. If anything, e is a concave function also, which only reinforces the concavity of xA2.T h e
combination of this reasoning and the results outlined in Table 1 suggests that, if electricity and
automobile pollution together are primary sources of air pollution emissions, EA
0  0a n dEA
0  0.
While the sources of CO2 emissions are largely the same as the above pollutants, and the gross
emissions effects are likely to be the same, this represents a different kind of environmental problem.
CO2 has no direct negative health or aesthetic impacts, and has until very recently never been treated as
a pollutant. The result is that there has been no basis–again, until recently–for willingness-to-pay to
reduce emissions. In the current context, one the expects emissions elasticity of income from historical
data will be a pure gross emissions effect. Indeed this is what cross-national studies of CO2 emissions
have shown.CO2 emissions data are taken from the World Development Indicators, the other pollution
concentration data are from the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS).Table 2 summarizes
the environmental indicators used in this study and the predicted effects of  and  on gross emissions
and abatement.
Independent variables
The above environmental indicators form the dependent variables in empirical applications of 17.
The two parameters of the income distribution  and , and the political indicator  are the independent
variables of focus, but several control variables are clearly necessary as well. Per capita income data are
virtually all from the Penn World Tables Mark IV. In a small number of cases, measured per capita
GDP (PPP) are available from the World Development Indicators, and unavailable in the PWT. The
resulting per capita income variable consists of 96% PWT data. A brief description of the sources,
measurement, and implementation of the other independent variables follows.Inequality: Gini coefficients
Income inequality (within countries) must be measured with microeconomic data. Measuring
inequality has a long history in the development literature [see Deaton (1997)], and there is no way to
capture inequality in a manner that is both simple and entirely satisfactory. The most common summary
measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient (or ratio). While computational shortcuts exist [Cowell
(1995), Deaton (1997)], the gini coefficient is intuitively derived from the Lorenz curve, where it is
interpretable as 2 times the area between the 450 line and the cumulative income share distribution.
Deineger and Squire (1996) have collected gini coefficients from an exhaustive review of household
surveys from 135 countries. These collected gini coefficients make up the variable ln in the data used
here. (As this measure is already a ratio, In some cases, there are competing Gini coefficient estimates
for the same country in the same year. I selected among these based on Deineger and Squires reported
‘quality’ of each study. These are based on coverage of the sample, income vs. expenditure, etc. In only
6 cases were there competing estimates of the same quality. In a reassuring sign, the estimates in these
cases are similar, and I used a simple average of the competing estimates. What remains is a sample of
gini coefficients for 1,170 country-years, 1,153 post-1950. This last group composes the universe of
possible observations in the analysis that follows.
Measuring : Political systems
The political data employed are from Polity 98 (Gurr and Jaggers) data measuring democracy. The
l o g i ch e r ei st h a t depends most critically on representation. That is, a more representative government
is more likely to fully consider willingness-to-pay to improve environmental conditions among its
citizens in designing policy. It is supposed here that democracies are more representative and therefore
policy in democracies is more likely to reflect citizens’ preferences [see Deacon (1999)].  is
constructed from the two summary variables provided in Polity 98 for nearly 6,500 country-years after
1950. The authors have scored regimes on a number of objective criteria, including the competitiveness
of the nominating process, institutional structures for political expression, and the extent to which
non-elites are able to access these structures. The judgements are summarized with a ‘democracy’ score
and an ‘autocracy’ score. Each variable takes values between zero and ten. Following a convention
suggested by the authors,  is constructed as the difference between the democracy and autocracy
scores, scaled to the unit interval. A  value of 1 suggests a complete democracy, where the government
in that country in that year satisfied all of the conditions for a democracy and none for an autocracy. A
value of 0 indicates the opposite: a complete dictatorship. For some country-years, the authors offer no
judgement, stating rather that government was in transition, a colonial construct, or no effective
authority existed. (Examples: Spain 1975, Iran 1979, South Africa, 1993). For these cases  was set
equal to zero and a dummy variable for TRANSITION was generated ( 1 if country in transition).
Government or regime type is correlated with income inequality, so that not properly controlling for
t h ep r e s e n c eo f will also bias estimates of the effect of inequality on pollution levels.8 For instance,
communist regimes have low income inequality and are likely to have poor environmental protection.
In such a case we would not want a low level of abatement to be attributed to the low inequality if it is
in fact due to a regime unresponsive to demand for public consumption goods like environmental
quality.It is common in this literature to further control for effects specific to communist regimes, both
out of concern for the quality of the data in general and because pollution appears to indeed have been
worse than income and other controls would predict. This additional control is not undertaken here. The
structural model presented emphasizes the role of the income distribution and government’s willingness
to provide public goods. The unique features in this area of communist countries in these dimensions
are viewed as a valuable test of the basic propositions.
Other controls
In the theory population N and the “transfer function”  enter the emissions equation
multiplicatively. This interaction of population and geographic features of the landscape isparsimoniously captured by population density (population per km2. The coefficient on this variable
represents the combined effect of these variables through gross pollution and demand for abatement.
The convention in this literature is to assume that effects common to observational units that do not
vary over time are random variables [Grossman and Krueger (1995), Shafik (1998)]. This specification
perhaps deserves more scrutiny that it has received, as the random effects estimator is inconsistent when
these effects are correlated with other omitted variables [Hsiao (1990)]. The attraction of the random
effects estimator is clear: the approach controls for effects common to observational units over time
(geographic and other physical measures, for instance). But unlike the fixed effects estimator, random
effects uses some of the between- (across-) group variation in the sample.
The fixed effects dummy variables approach employed here is consistent under more general
conditions, but will not make use of potentially model-identifying variation in income and pollution
levels across countries. The role of the fixed effects in this approach is as control for all other ommitted
variables, including h
0– which reflects supply side endowments in the economy, openness to trade, and
other fundamental factors. The fixed effects will control for these factors to the extent that they do not
vary over time within the sample. In the sense that economies can only slowly change their resource or
capital intensiveness, this is reasonable if not strictly correct.
Results
Table 3 presents the results for eight non-linear least squares regressions with fixed city- or
country-level effects.9 Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Coverage of the inequality data
constrain the observations available for estimation of 12 for all four environmental measures. Separate
regressions are therefore estimated with and without the restriction 2  4  0. The coefficient 1 in
each regression represents the elasticity of gross emissions with respect to average income, which the
theory suggested reduces to an average income elasticity for “dirty goods” at the household level. These
are all estimated to be positive, though the large standard errors (a product partially of fixed effects
estimation) make them statistically insignificant in 4 of the models estimated. These measured “gross
emissions” effects are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of the Gini ratios further characterizing the
income distribution, though this likely reflects in part the non-random reduction in the sample: Gini
coefficients are more widely available for developed economies. The volatility of the measured gross
emissions effect for small particulates in Table 3 provides little information about its magnitude.
The measured impacts of inequality on gross emissions measured by 2 appear significant, but the
direction of impact appears to depend on the pollutant. The negative elasticity measured for CO2 is
consistent with the motivation that the underlying dirty goods are relatively income-inelastic (also
supported by the estimated 1, but for SO2 and small particulates inequality appears to increase gross
emissions. This suggests that characteristics of the income distribution other than the mean may be
important omitted variables in the standard analysis, but the direction of the bias is uncertain.
The income elasticity of demand for abatement is measured by the estimates of 4. 10 The positive
and significant estimates in Table 3 strongly suggest that the specification in 12 is capable of
identifying this effect separate from gross emissions. The zero (even negative in one equation)
measured effect for CO2 only reinforces this view since we know that this by-product, now considered
the largest component of potentially damaging greenhouse gases, has until recently never been regarded
as a pollutant requiring regulation. For the other pollutants, which have been addressed through
pollution policy to some degree worldwide, the estimated income elasticities are all greater than one,
and are extremely large for SO2. While 4 represents a pure willingness-to-pay effect only as a special
case, these results provide substantial evidence that environmental protection is a luxury good in the
technical sense. Further evidence of this is provided by the positive estimates of 5. Recall that if
willingness-to-pay for abatement increases in household income at an increasing rate (w  0, greater
inequality would actually increase aggregate willingness-to-pay (see Appendix).
Positive values for both 1 and 4 was the starting point for the discussion of “turning points” in theempirical specification section. The data find this with the noted exception of CO2, for which it was not
expected. The combination of these elasticities are reflected in the income elasticity of total pollution:
p  1  4a. The estimated turning points implied by the estimated values are reported for each
equation at the bottom of Table 3. Consistent with the earlier discussion, these increase as  decreases
and in some cases become infinite (no turning point). Of course no turning point is estimated for CO2
for any , but the most illustrative cases are for particulates, where a turning point is estimated to exist
for higher values of  but not for lower values. The sensitivity of the estimated turning points to
inclusion of Gini coefficients in the model is characteristic of this literature, but contain a valuable
cautionary message. In questions of how economic growth will affect the environment, the answer may
depend on the part of the income distribution in which that growth is concentrated.
The fitted values of the dependent variables are plotted for each pollutant in the Appendix. Only for
SO2 does the estimated relationship immediately appear to fit the “inverted-U” pattern. For particulates
the fitted relationship is better described as strictly falling over the range of income values in the data,
and for CO2 nothing appears to correlated with emissions other than per capita GDP. An alternative
illustration of these results is presented in Tables 4 and 5. Income and political data are jointly available
for 105 countries in 1990. In this sample, per capita income (measured in 1985 US dollars) ranges from
399 in Chad to 18,054 in the United States. When this sample is split into “poor” and “rich” countries at
the median (Algeria), the average characteristics of the two groups are those reported in Table 3. In
addition to higher income, it is perhaps also no surprise that the rich group is substantially more
democratic and more equitable on average. The first column in Table 4 reports the predicted levels of
four environmental indicators for a hypothetical country with the all of the characteristics of the poor
group. The second column reports the predicted levels for a fictional country with the all of the
characteristics of the rich group, and so on. For these predicted values, the other independent variables
are set to their means, including the estimated fixed effects.
The fundamental question motivating this literature is what a “poor” country should expect in terms
of environmental impact as it looks forward to a level of wealth comparable to the “rich” country. Table
5 demonstrates that the answer will in general depend on whether income inequality and political
system evolve to reflect the characteristics of the rich country as well. As we have seen, little in the
historical data suggest anything other than income is correlated with CO2 emissions. However, for the
other three pollutants the results illustrate the importance of the political responsiveness. Compare the
middle column (“rich” income and inequality characteristics, but “poor” government effectiveness) to
the last column (where the political effectiveness of “rich” countries is imposed as well). Predicted SO2
concentrations fall by 54%, “smoke” by 34%, and heavy particulates by 25%. Similar reductions are
associated with political development when the Gini ratio is held constant at .41 (column 2 vs. column
4 in Table 5). The effects of reduced inequality are less obvious. Comparing columns 2 and 3, or
columns 4 and 5, isolates the effect of reduced inequality when the other characteristics are held
constant. Lower inequality is associated with lower concentrations of SO2 and smoke, but higher
concentrations of heavy particulates. Regardless, these results strongly indicate that increases in per
capita income alone without development in these other variables leads to a different path of
environmental indicators than political and economic development together.
Conclusion
The environmental Kuznets’ curve literature has been plagued by two closely related problems.
First, the complexity of the relationship between income and environmental quality means that no
simple microeconomic foundations are entirely satisfying. This has lead the vast majority of researchers
to approach empirical studies through a reduced form, which leads to the second problem: the estimated
income effects are a really a combination of effects (e.g. scale and technique) that cannot easily be
separated. This paper has addressed the “microfoundations” problem by abstracting away frominternational trade, an assumption roughly consistent with the evidence for several prominent air
pollutants, thereby allowing pollution to be traced to the ultimate source of household decisions. The
political economy component of the resulting semi-structural model then allowed for the decomposition
of income effects into parts associated with gross emissions and demand for abatement. The empirical
results are consistent with the theory that demand for both “dirty goods” and abatement increase with
income but demand for the second, a public good, is reflected to a greater extent in more democratic
political systems. As a consequence, economic growth alone (without political development) will not
result in improved air quality at higher levels of average income, and weaker political institutions
always delay or eliminate the arrival of such improvements.End notes:




2. It should include baseline, non-anthropogenic concentration of the pollutant as an intercept, but
in the absence of good data this will be dropped in the empirical work in favor of site-level random
effects. The true relationship between emissions and concentrations is enormously complex, but linear
“transfer coefficients” are believed to be a reasonable physical specification.
3. The restriction is that C
A be homogeneous of degree zero in A and E0. That is, that increases of
gross emissions and abatement of equal proportions don’t change marginal abatement costs.
4. For normal goods, if x0  0 and the income elasticity is a constant, “concave” and “convex”
demands are equivalent to income elasticities greater than and less than 1, respectively. By this logic it
is demand for luxury goods that are convex in income, though not by the specific definition of “luxury”
in consumer theory.
5. See Greene (1999) for the consistency of fixed effects in non-linear models.











7. Technically, identification is feasible in the current specification from the form of a.
8. Causation here is an entirely different question: does dramatic inequality provide fertile ground
for dicators, or do non-democratic governments tend to serve elites interests at the expense of the poor?
Either cause, or others, would lead to omitted variable bias.
9. Reported adjusted R2  1  uu
PP , not the within- and between-group R2 frequently reported for
panel data models. The dummy variables implementation of fixed effects for this non-linear model lead
to the very high proportion of variation explained by all models. As a reference, the estimation of 12
without fixed effects still results in high R2s: CO2: .79, SO2: .16, small particulates: .47, and large
particulates: .68.
10. From 12,3 should be regarded as a kind of intercept term in the relationship between optimal
abatement and the income distribution. Its interpretation is not central here.Aggreg. Micro.
signX  sign x
y 
signX  sign 2x
y2 
signW  sign w
y 











SO2    ?
CO2   00
heavy particulates    ?














































































































































Adj. R2 .542 .550 .791 .818 .857 .844 .709 .681

























































SO2 29.22 39.95 28.03 15.22
CO2 (emissions) 1.68 8.77 8.77 8.43
Smoke 3.34 39.71 34.59 23.04
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Proposition E0  X0   xy
Proof From 3 :


























y xy dy .
The income CDF Fy;, has following characteristics by definition:
 , F0;,  0, F

0  0
 , F;,  1, F

  0,











y holds  constant, this inequality-neutral income shift can be viewed as an “across the
board” increase in income by the same amount, as in the figure, meaning  F

y  fy  0. The
integral then represents the mean change in demand for x in the distribution x
y
, and recognizing









F(y; µ ,α )
F(y; µ ’, α )
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Integrate by parts to transform A4 in the same way, again using the characteristics of the CDF to








I n t e g r a t eb yp a r t so n c em o r ea s s i g n i n gu  xy and dv  F

ydy.












Refer to the figure above for the following observations about Vy:
i V0  0
ii V  0
iii Vy  0  y  0,




ii holds because the mean of the income distribution, , is being held constant. In Figure 3, the area
above the CDF before and after the change in  must be equal because this area is .
iii holds if the change in the income distribution is a “simple mean preserving spread” (Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1971), assuring the “old” and “new” CDFs cross only once. (This is a sufficient condition,
not necessary). Vy is positive as the CDF shifts upward at first, and only returns to zero at the highest
level of income in society.







Since iii states that Vy is  0 over the entire integral, the expression has the same sign as xy. y
F(y)
F(y; µ , α )









































































γγγγ = 0Fitted Values
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